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Highlights
• This paper presents a theoretical model of cartel enforcement and deterrence
• It shows that effective policy tends to deter cartels with low or high overcharges
• This provides an indirect route to test whether enforcement of cartel law is effective
• We use historical data on legal cartels to generate the counterfactual
• There is significantly less mass in the tails of the illegal overcharge distribution
• This result is robust to controlling for confounding factors
• We interpret this as the first tentative confirmation of effective deterrence
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Abstract
This paper investigates the deterrent impact of anti-cartel enforcement. It is shown theoretically that if
enforcement is effective in deterring and constraining cartels then there will be fewer cartels with low over-
charges and fewer with high overcharges. This prediction provides an indirect method for testing whether the
enforcement of competition law is effective. Using historical data on legal cartels to generate the counterfac-
tual, we find significantly less mass in the tails of the overcharge distribution, compared to illegal cartels. This
result is robust to controlling for confounding factors, and we interpret this as the first tentative confirmation
of effective deterrence.
Keywords: anti-cartel enforcement, deterrence, cartel overcharge
IWe are grateful for useful comments to Luca Aguzzoni, Jorge Ale Chilet, Carsten Crede, Morten Hviid, Nathan Miller,
Johannes Paha, Ronald Peeters, Giancarlo Spagnolo and participants of the 4th International Workshop: Economics of Com-
petition and Industrial Organization in Cape Town, the CMA-DG COMP Workshop on Looking Beyond the Direct Effects of
the Work of Competition Authorities, the DIW Berlin, the 2016 Workshop on Antitrust and Industrial Organization at the
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, EARIE (2016) the CCP Norwich Seminar Series, and to David Reader and
Ken Zhang for their research assistance. We are also in debt to Professor John Connor for making his cartel overcharge dataset
available. The support of the Centre for Competition Policy is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier May 4, 2018
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
”No modern development in antitrust law is more striking than the global acceptance of a norm that
condemns cartels as the market’s most dangerous competitive vice [but] is modern cartel enforcement attaining
its deterrence goals?” William Kovacic (OECD Conference, October 2013), former Chair of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission
When an active cartel is convicted and shut down, competition policy is working. It is only because
there is a competition law prohibiting collusion and a government agency (or private plaintiffs) enforcing
the law that the cartel is no longer operating. Evidence that anti-cartel enforcement is disabling cartels is
then easy to find. What is more difficult is determining whether anti-cartel enforcement is deterring cartels
from forming and constraining the prices set by those cartels that are not deterred. It could well be the
case that, in spite of the best efforts of competition authorities, just as many cartels form and collusive
prices are just as high as if collusion was legal. While such a bleak reality seems unlikely, there is very little
evidence addressing these fundamental questions concerning the efficacy of competition policy: Are cartels
being deterred? Are cartel overcharges lower? The absence of evidence is not due for a lack of want to
address these important questions but rather because they are intrinsically challenging. While we observe
the overcharges of some cartels (those that formed and were detected), we do not know the overcharges
they would have set in the absence of competition law and enforcement. While we observe some of the
cartels that form, we do not know the cartels that would have formed in the absence of competition law and
enforcement.1
The objective of this paper is to develop and implement a strategy for assessing whether competition law
and enforcement is effective in deterring some cartels from forming and constraining the overcharges set by
those cartels that do form. Using the standard theory of collusion, we first derive a testable implication if
firms are taking into account anti-cartel enforcement when they decide on whether to form a cartel and what
prices to charge. We show that colluding firms will be less likely to have high overcharges if they recognise
the prospect of being detected and penalised. This property comes from competition policy constraining
the collusive price because it makes collusion less stable, either because firms have a stronger incentive to
cheat (due to a lower value attached to colluding) or detection is more likely when price is higher. We next
show that colluding firms are also less likely to have low overcharges if they recognise the prospect of being
detected and penalised when deciding whether to form a cartel. This property comes from competition policy
deterring those cartels from forming that anticipate having low overcharges. In interpreting these results, it
1To be clear, the ”absence of competition law and enforcement” means that a cartel can operate without concern of being
shut down and forced to pay penalties. It does not mean they are able to enforce a collusive agreement through the use of
contracts enforced by the courts.
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is useful to keep in mind that the issue is not whether there is a chance of a cartel being convicted (clearly
there is because cartels are routinely convicted) but rather whether firms act as if there is a substantive
chance of conviction when deciding whether to form a cartel and what price to set. That is an empirical
question.
The testable hypothesis from the theory of collusion is then: if competition law and enforcement substan-
tively enters the calculus of cartel formation and collusive price-setting, then the overcharge distribution for
illegal cartels will have less mass in the lower tail (because low overcharge cartels do not form) and less mass
in the upper tail (because price is constrained), compared to when they are not taking account of competition
law and enforcement. To test this hypothesis, we construct a counterfactual overcharge distribution drawn
from historical data on cartels which were observed under legal regimes (either regimes in which cartels were
not illegal or where exemptions were granted.) This is then compared to the equivalent historical distri-
bution for illegal cartels. If illegal cartels are not taking into account the prospect of competition law and
enforcement then we should not find any difference between the overcharge distributions for illegal and legal
cartels. If, however, they are taking account of anti-cartel enforcement in their decision-making, then the
overcharge distribution for illegal cartels should have less mass in both tails than the overcharge distribution
for legal cartels. Our empirical analysis provides supporting evidence for this hypothesis: When competition
law and enforcement is present, cartels are less likely to set high overcharges and also less likely to set low
overcharges.
Execution of this empirical strategy is, however, vulnerable to two possible sources of sample selection
bias. Ideally, one would want a random assignment of cartels in terms of legal status. Of course, there is
not random assignment. Whether a cartel is legal depends on the time and place (is there a competition
law?) and the industry (is that industry exempt from competition law?) For example, a majority of illegal
cartels in our data set existed after 1945, while a majority of legal cartels occurred prior to 1945. If the
overcharge distribution for all cartels - whether legal or illegal - has less mass in the tails post-1945 compared
to pre-1945 then that would bias our empirical analysis to finding an effect of competition policy when there
is none. We employ two alternative approaches for correcting for such potential selection bias. The first is
to control for all observable potentially confounding factors in a multiple quantile regression model. The
second is to apply a propensity score matching quantile procedure to ensure that in estimating the treatment
effects, legal and illegal cartels have similar characteristics. Results are robust to this correction, whichever
way it is conducted. Nevertheless, there are inevitable data constraints on what can be observed on such a
large historical database. Therefore, we interpret our positive results as preliminary, and conditional on the
quality of the available data.
While legal cartels have no reason to hide themselves, illegal cartels do and this creates a second possible
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source of sample selection bias. In using the distribution on overcharges for discovered illegal cartels, it
is presumed to be a random sample of the distribution on overcharges for all illegal cartels. However, as
characterised in Harrington and Wei (2017), the set of discovered illegal cartels will typically be a biased
sample of the set of all illegal cartels. Furthermore, if the likelihood of being discovered is correlated with
the extent of the overcharge, then the distribution on overcharges for discovered illegal cartels can differ from
that for legal cartels even if the distribution for illegal cartels (discovered and undiscovered) is the same as
that for legal cartels. While we are unable to offer a correction, or test for this type of bias, we critically
examine how it might affect our analysis and conclude that it is unlikely to produce our empirical findings.
As reviewed in [15], there is an extensive theoretical literature examining the effect of competition policy
on collusive prices and cartel formation. As the contribution of this paper is in developing and executing a
method for testing the deterrent effect of competition policy on cartels, the literature review will focus on
the empirical research that contributes to that objective.
Given the obvious challenge that deterred cartels are, by their nature, unobserved, the empirical literature
has been relatively sparse.2 However, this lack of information has spawned a variety of methodologies for
using data on variables we do observe for making deductions about those we do not. The most direct
approach is to use the observed number of cases. [25] interprets the immediate increase in cartel discoveries
after the introduction of the US leniency programme, followed by a subsequent readjustment below pre-
leniency levels, as consistent with enhanced deterrence capabilities. [6] uses a cartel birth-death model to
make inferences on EU cartel detection rates. [1] applies a logic similar to Miller, to the long-term trends
in cartel discoveries observed in an international panel of CAs. They find evidence of an inverse U-shape
relationship, which they attribute to the gradual increase over time in deterrence as CAs become more
successful in their enforcement.
A number of less direct, but inventive, approaches have also been employed. [27], drawing on ecological
methods, shows how recidivism can be used to identify the latent cartel rate from which changes over time
can reveal something about changing deterrence. [16] show theoretically how a change in the duration of
detected cartels can be used as a measure of policy effectiveness. Both [10] and [11] examine post-detection
changes in merger rates in previously cartelised markets to impute whether explicit collusion may have been
replaced by tacit collusion.3
Our own empirical approach here will be to compare the frequencies and characteristics of cartels observed
under legal and illegal jurisdictions. Perhaps surprisingly, relatively little work has been undertaken to
2CMA (2017) provides a useful overview of the literature from a policy maker’s perspective.
3[11] shares with the current paper its use of Connor’s extensive historical database.
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date making such comparisons. A recent notable exception is [20] which offers a detailed picture of what
happens absent competition policy by employing data from a period of legal cartels, Finnish manufacturing
industries 1951-1990. Although they have no explicit counterfactual, they are able to draw some inter-
temporal conclusions: if not illegal, cartels are typically long-lived and their frequency increases inexorably
over time: by the end of their period, they observe that almost all industries were cartelised.
Finally, [9] employs the estimates from the current paper to calibrate a framework which is designed to
quantify the relative magnitudes of deterred cartel harm relative to detected and undetected harms. Even
employing the most conservative of their estimates, they show that deterred harm is seven times greater
than detected (i.e. observed), harms.4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the theory, Section 2 describes
the data and presents key descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the choice of empirical estimators, and
presents results and sensitivity tests. Section 4 assesses the possibility of selection bias. Section 5 concludes.
1. Theory
The purpose of this section is to show that the standard model of collusion has implications for how
the distribution of overcharges depends on the legal status of cartels. To keep the analysis manageable, the
canonical setting of symmetric firms and perfect monitoring is assumed. As the main result is driven by
forces that will be operative in richer models, we later argue that the hypothesis delivered by the theory is
a robust one.
Consider an oligopoly with n ≥ 2 firms that offer symmetrically differentiated products and have identical
cost functions. Let pi
(
pi, p−i
)
be a firm’s profit when its price is pi ∈ R+ and the vector of prices for the other
n−1 firms is p−i ∈ R
n−1
+ . Assume pi
(
pi, p−i
)
is continuously differentiable in all firms’ prices, quasi-concave
in a firm’s own price, and increasing in other firms’ prices.
There is assumed to exist a symmetric static Nash equilibrium,
pn = arg max
pi
pi (pi, (p
n, ..., pn)) .
pi (p) is a firm’s profit when all firms charge a common price p and is assumed to be continuously differentiable
4Amongst policy makers there have been occasional qualitative survey studies involving interviews of competition practi-
tioners, lawyers and companies, which have attempted to quantify what they refer to as deterrence multipliers (the ratio of
deterred to detected harms); for example, [26]. These multipliers are typically in the region of five upwards.
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and strictly quasi-concave. Hence, the joint profit-maximising price exists,
pm ≡ arg max
p
pi (p) .
The associated profits are denoted:
pin ≡ pi (pn, (pn, ..., pn)) , pim ≡ pi (pm) .
It is assumed pin < pim and pm > pn.
Firms interact for an infinite number of periods with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) . When firms
illegally collude and charge a price p, there is a probability σ(p) that the cartel is discovered, penalised, and
permanently shut down.5 σ (p) : R+ → [0, 1] is a continuously differentiable non-decreasing function.6 As it
is firms communicating to coordinate their prices that determines illegality, and not whether they succeeded
in doing so, we assume a cartel has a chance of being caught and convicted even when it sets the competitive
price: σ (pn) > 0. The penalty F (p) : R+ → R+ is a continuously differentiable non-decreasing function with
F (pn) > 0 so that the act of colluding always brings with it some penalty, which is consistent with antitrust
practice.
A cartel is assumed to select the best (symmetric) collusive price using the grim punishment.7 Let V c(p)
denote the collusive value associated with collusive price p and V n ≡ pin/(1 − δ) denote the non-collusive
value. V c(p) is recursively defined by:
V c(p) = pi (p) + δ(1− σ (p))V c(p) + δσ (p)V n − σ (p)F (p),
which we can solve to yield
V c(p) =
pi (p)− σ (p)F (p) + δσ (p)V n
1− δ(1− σ (p)) . (1)
Define
pid (p) ≡ arg max
pi
pi (pi, (p, ..., p))
5It is straightforward to extend the analysis to when the cartel can re-form with some probability, and we conjecture that
all of our conclusions would remain the same.
6The dependence of the probability of paying penalties on price is considered in [3] in a static setting and Harrington (2004,
2005) in a dynamic setting. For a discussion of various sources of detection, see [18].
7We discuss later why we believe the main result is robust to the punishment.
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as a firm’s maximal deviation profit. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) is
pi (p) + δ(1− σ (p))V c(p) + δσ (p)V n − σ (p)F (p) ≥ pid (p) + δV n − θσ (p)F (p) (2)
where θ ∈ {0, 1} is a parameter that captures the possibility of a leniency program. If there is no leniency
program then θ = 1 and a firm that deviates is liable for penalties.8 If there is a leniency program (with full
leniency) then θ = 0 in which case it is optimal for the deviating firm to apply for leniency and avoid the
penalty. Re-arranging (2), we have
δ(1− σ (p)) [V c(p)− V n] ≥ pid (p)− pi (p) + (1− θ)σ (p)F (p). (3)
The optimal collusive price is that which maximises V c(p) in (1) subject to the ICC in (3).
Define p∗I as the optimal collusive price when the cartel is illegal, which means σ (p
n) > 0. Setting
σ (p) = 0 ∀p in (1) and (3) yields the optimal collusive price when the cartel is legal, which is denoted p∗L.
We interpret p∗L and p
∗
I as upper bounds on the collusive price when the cartel is legal and illegal, respectively.
As shown later, p∗L always exists but p
∗
I may not exist because there is no collusive price satisfying (3). Proofs
are in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. i) p∗I ≤ p∗L; ii) if σ′ (pm) > 0 then p∗I < p∗L; and iii) if p∗L < pm then p∗I < p∗L.
Let us assess the impact of a cartel’s legal status on price as described by Prop. 1.9 Conditional on a
cartel operating, legal cartels will price at least as high as illegal cartels. If the probability of detection and
conviction is higher when the collusive price is higher (more specifically, σ′ (pm) > 0) then an illegal cartel
will price strictly lower. Even when the probability of detection is independent of price, if a legal cartel is
constrained in the price that it sets (that is, p∗L < p
m) then again making collusion illegal will cause price
to be strictly lower. The intuition is straightforward. First, the prospect of incurring penalties reduces the
value to colluding which makes cartel members more inclined to cheat. In order to ensure that collusion is
stable (that is, equilibrium conditions are satisfied), the collusive price may need to be set lower compared
to when the cartel is legal. Second, the desire to reduce the likelihood of detection will induce an illegal
cartel to lower its price relative to when collusion is legal. To summarise, if both legal and illegal cartels are
stable for a given set of market conditions then the constraint of competition law lowers the collusive price.
It also means a lower overcharge, which is defined as (pc − pn)/pn where pc is the collusive price.
8This assumption reflects the common legal practice that collusion is a per se offense. It is the act of communicating to
coordinate behavior that is illegal (or taken as evidence of illegality), and not the actual prices that are charged.
9Some recent papers also consider the impact of competition law enforcement on overcharges when penalties depend on
price and show that the result is robust to alternative modelling assumptions. See [22], [23] and [19].
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While the upper bound on the collusive price is lower when collusion is illegal, we’ll now show that the
lower bound to the collusive price is higher when collusion is illegal. For this purpose, define p∗
L
and p∗
I
as
the greatest lower bound to the optimal collusive price when collusion is legal and illegal, respectively,
p∗
L
≡ inf {p∗L (δ) : δ ∈ (0, 1)} , p∗I ≡ inf {p∗I (δ) : δ ∈ (0, 1)} .
Proposition 2. p∗
I
> p∗
L
= pn.
When collusion brings with it some expected penalty, collusion is profitable only if the rise in price from
colluding is large enough to compensate for that penalty. Cartels that are unable to sustain sufficiently high
overcharges will then be unstable and thus not form. Hence, the overcharge must be bounded above zero
when the cartel is illegal. A corollary to this result is: If σ(pn) > 0 then there is a lower bound on the
discount factor δ˜ > 0 such that p∗I exists if and only if δ ≥ δ˜.10 In comparison, the lower bound on the
discount factor for legal collusion to be stable is zero.
1.1. Hypothesis and numerical analysis
Let us summarise the preceding results. Holding fixed the set of market conditions, if collusion is stable
both when it is legal and illegal then the optimal collusive price is (weakly) higher when the cartel is legal.
Hence, the upper bound on the collusive price is lower when collusion is illegal. This result suggests that
legal cartels are more likely than illegal cartels to have high overcharges. However, it is also the case that the
lower bound on the collusive price is higher when collusion is illegal. This result suggests that legal cartels
are more likely than illegal cartels to have low overcharges. The creation and enforcement of a competition
law prohibiting collusion is then predicted to compress the distribution of overcharges for it reduces the
frequency of both low markups and high markups.
Before moving on, let us discuss the robustness of these results. The higher lower bound for unlawful
collusive prices comes from the lower value attached to an illegal cartel because of penalties. Firms will
collude only if they can set an overcharge large enough to offset expected penalties. That result is quite
general and does not rely on symmetry, perfect monitoring, or the type of punishment (in particular, it would
hold as well for a punishment more severe than reversion to a static Nash equilibrium). The lower upper
bound for unlawful collusive prices is implied by a higher price making detection more likely (so an illegal
cartel prefers a lower price) and by expected penalties lowering the collusive value (so the ICC is tighter and
thus an illegal cartel cannot sustain as high a price). Again, these forces are not tied to either symmetry or
10The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose that an optimal collusive price for an unlawful cartel, p∗I (δ), exists for all
δ > 0. For a lawful cartel, limδ→0 p∗L(δ) = p
n. Given that p∗L(δ) < p
m implies p∗I (δ) < p
∗
L(δ) by Prop. 1, it follows that
limδ→0 p∗I (δ) = p
n. However, that result contradicts a lower bound on p∗I (δ) above p
n.
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perfect monitoring, and the form of the punishment does not matter as long as the punishment is not more
severe when firms illegally collude.11
One model extension that could work against Prop. 1 is allowing the probability of detection to be
sensitive to price changes. As shown in Harrington (2004), a member of an illegal cartel is less inclined to
deviate when the lower prices induced by that deviation makes detection (and paying penalties) more likely.
While that effect works in the direction of loosening the ICC and raising the collusive price, it would have
to be sufficiently strong relative to the other effects (i.e., a lower price level is preferred because it reduces
the probability of detection and a lower collusive value makes cheating relatively more profitable and thus
requires price to be lower) in order for the optimal collusive price to be higher for illegal cartels.
Finally, we believe the results are robust to the form of the penalty. It has been assumed that the penalty
is based on the collusive price charged when the firm is caught, and the expected penalty is non-decreasing
in that price. In practice, penalties depend on duration and can be sensitive to the entire price series during
the episode of collusion (such as with customer damages). Such a possibility is considered in Harrington
(2004, 2005) and, while it would complicate the analysis, we do not think it would change results because
the penalty would still be monotonic in the collusive price and reduce collusive value and thereby tighten
the ICC. In some jurisdictions, the penalty is proportional to revenue and, as shown in [2], a revenue-based
penalty can cause the optimal collusive price to exceed the monopoly price under some circumstances. In
that situation, it is possible that illegality could imply higher overcharges. However, our results would be
robust as long as the probability of paying penalties is sufficiently sensitive to price so that the expected
penalty remains non-decreasing in price.
The predicted differences between overcharges for legal and illegal cartels are predicated upon competition
law influencing the behaviour of firms when deciding whether to form a cartel and, in the event a cartel is
formed, the prices that they set. It is clear that if a competition authority is catching and convicting cartels
then, in fact, σ (p) > 0. Furthermore, cartelists recognise that they might be caught when they conduct their
meetings in secret, instruct each other not to retain a written record, and, more generally, actively try to
avoid detection. Nevertheless, there is still the question of whether firms act as if σ (p) > 0 in their decisions
to form a cartel and the price to charge. Having formed an illegal cartel, are firms induced to moderate the
price increase to maintain cartel stability (because the prospect of paying penalties lowers the collusive value
which then tightens the equilibrium condition) or to make detection less likely (when σ′ (p) > 0)? When
11If the punishment was more severe then it could possibly loosen the ICC and allow the illegal cartel to set a higher price.
However, there is no reason to think that firms would punish a deviation more severely when the cartel is illegal than when it
is legal. Even if it that were true, the punishment would have to be sufficiently more severe to offset the lower collusive value,
if it is to result in a looser ICC for illegal cartels.
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deciding to form a cartel, do firms perceive σ (p) > 0 and, as a consequence, are deterred from forming a
cartel when the anticipated overcharge is insufficient to result in the expected rise in profits exceeding the
expected penalties? While the detection and conviction of cartels is evidence that competition policy is
disabling some cartels, it is not evidence that it is deterring some cartels from forming or constraining the
overcharges set by cartels.
The theoretical results derived provide an avenue to testing the claim that competition policy is deterring
some cartels from forming and constraining the prices charged of those cartels that do form. The testable
hypothesis from the theory which we will take to the data is the following:
Hypothesis: If firms take account of the possibility of enforcement when deciding whether to form a cartel
and what price to charge (when a cartel is formed) then the distribution of overcharges for illegal
cartels will have less mass in the lower tail and less mass in the upper tail than the distribution of
overcharges for legal cartels.
As a corollary, effective enforcement need not imply that the average overcharge is lower. In fact the
impact on average overcharge is ambiguous. First, the cartels that form under either the legal or illegal
regimes have lower overcharges when collusion is illegal, and second, the low-overcharge cartels no longer
form under the illegal regime. There is then no theoretical basis for more effective competition policy to
result in a lower average cartel overcharge. Rather, it should manifest itself through less mass in the tails of
the distribution of overcharges.
For the purpose of illustration, a numerical example is provided to show how effective competition
enforcement is reflected in the distributions of overcharges (as described in Hypothesis). Like the data set
that will be examined, consider a population of markets that vary in terms of market conditions (specifically,
demand and cost functions) and the ease with which firms can collude (as captured by the discount factor).
Specifying a standard representative consumer model of differentiated products with quadratic utility, d ∈
[0, 1] measures the extent of similarity in firms’ products where d = 0 is independent products and d = 1
is homogeneous goods.12 Firms have a common constant marginal cost c and a common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) . Assume two firms and normalize the other demand parameters so that a market is defined by
(c, d, δ) .13
To limit the number of parameters, the penalty and probability of detection are assumed not to vary with
the collusive price. However, so that the penalty is related to market conditions, F equals half of monopoly
12Details regarding the theoretical model and the numerical analysis are in Appendix B.
13The case of heterogeneity with respect to the number of firms can be captured by d in that it controls the intensity of
competition.
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Figure 1: The simulated density of overcharges, with and without enforcement
profit. For a market (c, d, δ), we calculate the symmetric Nash equilibrium price, the collusive price when
collusion is legal (σ = 0), and the collusive price when collusion is illegal (σ = 0.05). From these prices, the
legal overcharge,
p∗L−pn
pn , and illegal overcharge,
p∗I−pn
pn , are calculated.
A population of markets is represented by a set of random draws on (c, d, δ) according to independent
truncated normal distributions. Figure 1 reports the kernel estimates.14 Reflecting the properties in Hy-
pothesis, the overcharge distribution for legal cartels has more mass in the lower and upper tails. Let us now
turn to examining the empirical overcharge distributions in order to assess whether they have this property.
2. The database and descriptive statistics
To test this hypothesis we conduct an empirical comparison between legal and illegal cartels, employing
an existing database in the public domain. This has been constructed over a number years by John Connor
and various associates, and, to our knowledge, is the most extensive aggregation of past empirical studies
of cartel overcharge. Here, we use the most recent published form (Connor, 2014, Appendices 1 and 2). In
effect, this is a meta-analysis of hundreds of previous studies drawn from across the world and over time.
This is appropriate for our purpose since it includes a sizeable number of legal cartels. These were cartels
which operated in countries and time periods when cartels were not illegal, or were granted exemptions from
cartel laws (notably export cartels). Each cartel is classified by whether it was illegal, legal or ‘extra-legal’
and it is explained in Connor (2014, p.33) that:
”Three-fourths of the cartels (75%) were found to be in violation of antitrust laws [...] Eighteen
14δ ∼ TN(0.35, 0.12), c ∼ TN(0.35, 0.12), d ∼ TN(0.5, 0.12), a = 1, b = 1, F = 0.5pim.
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percent of the remaining cartelized markets are known or believed to be “legal,” because they
operated prior to the enactment of antitrust laws in the jurisdictions in which they functioned or
because they were organized and registered under antitrust exemptions, such as export cartels or
ocean shipping conferences. About 7% of the cartels may be described as “extra-legal” because
there was nothing in the case material indicating that an antitrust authority punished them.”
From his published tables, we have constructed our legal sample to include all those that Connor cate-
gorises as ‘legal’, and a small number (ten) of his ‘extra-legal’ category.15 In all, this gives us a sample of
107 legal cartels and 395 illegal cartels. Many cartels had multiple episodes, and these cartels account for
390 and 1107 episodes respectively. For the purposes of this paper we focus primarily on cartel episodes as
the unit of observation, but cartel-level results will also be provided as part of our robustness checks.
For each cartel/episode, we employ the mean episodic overcharge. Overcharge is defined (Connor 2014,
p.6-10) as [(pc−pn)/pn]×100 where pc is the observed cartel price and pn is the ”but for” price, i.e. the price
which would have obtained had the cartel not existed. The methods used to recover the but for price vary
across the primary sources, but include prices observed before and after cartels’ existence, price observed
during price wars etc.16 The database also reports various other characteristics of the cartels, including their
geographical and chrononological locations, and these are used in Section 3 below.
Table 1 provides the first informal test of our hypothesis, by comparing the two samples. The median
is slightly larger for legal cartels, and a Mann Whitney test confirms that this is significant; but what is
relevant for our purposes are the two tails of the legal distribution. At the lower end, overcharges of 5% or
less occur twice as frequently in the legal sample than in the illegal sample; at the upper end, overcharges
of at least 50% are nearly twice as frequent in the legal sample compared to the illegal.
Table 1: Legal versus Illegal Cartels: Descriptive Statistics
Legal overcharge Illegal overcharge
Cartels 107 395
Cartel episodes 390 1107
Median episodic overcharge 27.0 22.0
Standard deviation (episode) 71.34 132.33
Overcharge (episode) 5% or less 21.7% 10.7%
Overcharge (episode) 5-50% 50.6% 74.2%
Overcharge (episode) more than 50% 27.7% 15.1%
Figure 2, which shows the kernel density plots, provides visual confirmation (the two curves intersect at
15From our readings of his extra-legal cases, most were probably illegal or sometimes not even strictly cartels at all; but in
these ten cases we believe that the cartels were genuinely legal. Our judgements are based largely on the case details provided
in [8], and in some cases supplemented by literature searches on the specific cartels.
16More detailed information on the counterfactual price used in the individual studies is given in Connor (2014).
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Figure 2: Density plot of overcharge under illegal and legal regimes
6% and 40% overcharges). A conventional Kolmogorov–Smirnov test strongly rejects the hypothesis of no
difference (p=0.000) between the two samples.
3. The distributional effect of cartel legality
This finding establishes a statistically significant difference between the distributions of legal and illegal
cartels in Connor’s database - one previously unnoticed by Connor or other researchers (e.g. Bolotova 2009,
Table 4) who have not looked beyond a comparison of sample means. In itself, this is an interesting historical
fact, but as a direct test of our above hypothesis it is insufficient for two reasons. First, assignment into the
treatment (i.e. whether a regime legalises cartels) is unlikely to be random (i.e. other things are unlikely to
be equal across the two sub-samples), and this raises a potential bias in any unconditional comparison such
as in Figure 2. Second, it should be recalled that this dataset includes, of course, only detected cartels. For
illegal cartels in particular, there is a further potential bias if detection varies systematically with overcharge.
In this section, we address the first of these potential biases; the second is discussed in the next section.
3.1. Quantile Regression
An analytically convenient methodology for comparing the two distributions is quantile regression analy-
sis (as discussed in Koenker and Bassett, 1978). More specifically, we are interested in the quantile treatment
effect (QTE), where for a given centile, the QTE corresponds to the horizontal distance between two cumu-
lative distribution functions.
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Let T = 1 if the cartel is in a legal regime, and T = 0 if it is in the illegal regime. Correspondingly,
overcharge is denoted as Y (1), and Y (0), and the τ -th quantile of overcharge is q1,τ and q0,τ . Following
[12]17 the quantile treatment effect (QTE) is given by:
Q̂TE = q̂1,τ − q̂0,τ (4)
where q̂j,τ ≡ infq Pr(Y (j) < q) ≥ τ , j ∈ {0, 1}. A simple quantile regression using only information of
legality is effectively the regression equivalent of Figure 2.
The problem with Equation (4) is that for any given individual, we observe q1,τ or q0,τ , but never both.
As assignment into the treatment (i.e. whether a regime legalises cartels) is unlikely to be random (i.e. other
things are unlikely to be equal across the two sub-samples), we face a potential bias in the unconditional
treatment effect estimate.
Further examination of the 107 legal cartels reveals that 88 occurred in jurisdictions/time periods without
applicable cartel law, while 13 were export cartels and 6 were other exemptions or government-tolerated.
In most jurisdictions, the prohibition of cartels only dates from the second half of the twentieth century,
or later, so it is likely that more of the legal cartels occurred relatively longer ago. This is confirmed by
Connor’s own statistics: 70% of legal episodes occurred pre-1945, as opposed to 15% of illegal. To provide
a visual check on whether time affects our headline story, Figure 3 shows the empirical density curves for
legal/illegal cartel episodes for the pre-1945 and the post-1974 part of our sample (we chose these cutoff
points to have an equal number of years in both sub-samples). Figure 3 suggests that our story in the two
tails is robust even when we compare only cartels from the same time periods.
Nevertheless, there may be other reasons why the unconditional independence assumption may not hold,
and we address these next.
3.2. Correcting for selection bias
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) explain that, for Equation (4) to provide unbiased estimates, two assump-
tions must be satisfied. The first is the unconfoundedness assumption (as referred to above as independence):
the overcharges under legal and illegal regimes (i.e. the quantiles of the two distributions) should be inde-
pendent of assignment into the legal group once we control for a vector X of observable differences between
the two regimes: (q1,τ,i, q0,τ,i) ⊥ Ti | Xi. Conditional on X the illegal overcharge distribution is the same
as the overcharge distribution of legal cartels had they not been legal (and vice versa). The second is the
overlap assumption: each observation i has some non-zero probability of being in the legal and in the illegal
17Our choice of Firpo’s method is based on our assumption of exogenous treatment (see below).
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Figure 3: Density plots of overcharge (legal/illegal) for pre-1945 and post-1974 years
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groups at each combination of covariate values: 0 < Pr(Ti = 1 | X) < 1 (i.e. the covariate distributions are
similar for the legal and illegal sub-samples).
We offer two alternative approaches for correcting for selection bias. The first is a straightforward
(conditional) multiple quantile regression controlling for X to derive the quantile estimators q̂1,τ,i(X), and
q̂0,τ,i(X). From Connor’s data, we identify X, which might explain, or control for whether a cartel is legal
or illegal:
• Whether it occurred before 1945.
• Geographical coverage (US, EU, Asia, International), to allow for heterogeneity across jurisdictions.
• Industry (manufacturing, raw materials, transportation, services).
• Type of agreement (bid rigging or other).
One potential problem with this approach is that - as we will show below - the overlap assumption appears
to be violated in our data. Another potential issue relates to the different interpretation of conditional versus
unconditional quantile regression estimators (Firpo et al., 2009). We argue that we can sidestep this latter
point for two reasons: (1) Conditional coefficients offer poor information on how individuals are affected
by the treatment. But our focus here is not on the individual, rather on the distributional effects. (2)
Below we use a two stage approach, whereby we first generate two matched groups for the legal and illegal
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subsamples, and, second, compare the differences in quantiles for these two groups. In this respect this is
not the conditional quantile regression described in Firpo et al. (2009).
As part of our two-stage approach the first step estimates the propensity of ”receiving the treatment”
(being in a legal regime), and the second uses weights derived from the propensity of treatment and matches
the observations for the two samples. We discard all unmatched episodes. This constructed counterfactual
overcharge distribution is then used to estimate the QTE.18
As an alternative robustness check, we follow Firpo (2007), who uses propensity scores to weight, rather
than match, the observations, i.e. inverse probability weights (IPW). IPW estimators allow us to retain a
larger sample size, which has efficiency advantages, but is not the best choice when the estimated treatment
probabilities get too close to 0 or 1, and here we have a large number of propensity scores close to zero, so
we need to trim observations to eliminate those with extreme weights. Although this is not as efficient as
removing observations that cannot be matched based on their propensity scores, it allows us to verify that
our results are not sensitive to the choice of the matching method.
As discussed above, one of the main assumptions required for unbiased QTE estimates is that assignment
into the treatment group (legal regime) is exogenous to the outcome variable (overcharge), and that the
covariate vector X fully determines selection into the treatment. Our data on the characteristics of cartels
is limited, nevertheless, we believe that the variables included in X are important determinants of whether
cartels are legal or illegal. Moreover, whether a country legalises cartels does not depend on the magnitude
of cartel overcharges. Put differently, if a cartel is illegal, then it will not become legal just because it has a
lower overcharge and vice versa.
Table 2: Mean of the covariates for the unmatched and matched samples
Unmatched Matched
Illegal Legal p-val Illegal Legal p-val
Pre 1945 cartels 0.146 0.862 0.000 0.695 0.619 0.170
US cartels 0.232 0.364 0.000 0.400 0.460 0.260
European cartels 0.310 0.318 0.767 0.357 0.225 0.001
Asian cartels 0.088 0.059 0.073 0.119 0.138 0.626
Bid rigging 0.238 0.028 0.000 0.039 0.055 0.555
Manufacturing 0.663 0.797 0.000 0.746 0.758 0.751
Transportation 0.031 0.051 0.061 0.067 0.061 0.761
Raw materials 0.141 0.133 0.710 0.159 0.139 0.491
Services 0.095 0.018 0.000 0.029 0.042 0.527
N 1497 1117
To show that the generated counterfactual offers a good match not only for the distribution of propensity
18A detailed explanation of our matching strategy is given in the Appendix.
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scores but also for the distribution of the individual covariates, Table 2 reports the means of the legal and
illegal sub-samples for the unmatched and the matched cases and the p-values of the corresponding t-tests.
Matching improves the similarity between the covariate distributions of the treated and untreated samples;
with only one exception (European cartels), there are now no significant differences in the covariates.
Table 2 also sheds some light on the weights generated by the propensity score matching - and how
we consequently re-weight the legal and illegal samples. It is clear that much larger weight is assigned to
pre-1945 illegal cartels, and illegal bid rigging cartels; relatively more weight is also given to US and less to
Asian cartels.
3.3. Results
Table 3 reports the estimated QTEs for the estimators described above.19 In effect, these show the
differences between the two samples at each of the quantiles. The first column reports the results without
controlling for any covariates. For example, the 25th centile for the legal sample is 4.2% lower than for the
illegal, which means that the smallest 25% of legal cartels set lower overcharges than the smallest 25% of
illegal cartels. As can be seen, the legal sample has significantly lower quantiles than the illegal distribution
up to and including the 30th centile. In the upper tail, the reverse is true; for example, the 75% centile is
16% larger for the legal sample; this means that the highest overcharge legal cartels set larger overcharges
than the highest illegal cartels. This is significantly so from the 50th centile upwards. These results are
effectively the regression equivalent of Figure 2. However, if assignment into the treatment is not random,
then these estimates are likely to be biased.
19For the regressions on cartel episodes (columns 1-4), standard errors are clustered by cartels.
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Column (2) reports the results for multiple quantile regression model where we control for the vector
of observables X by adding them to the quantile regressions.20 The results are qualitatively unchanged in
that the lower tail of the legal distribution is defined by significantly smaller overcharges than the illegal
distribution (up to and including the 35th centile), and the upper tail is defined by significantly larger
overcharges for the legal than the illegal distribution (from the 80th centile upwards). Alternatively, Column
(3) shows the QTEs when the two distributions are matched and weighted, as described above, by following
propensity scores and including ties (standard errors were calculated using a weighted variance-covariance
matrix). Again, the key finding is confirmed: the lower legal tail occurs at smaller overcharges (up to the
20th centile) and the upper legal tail occurs at higher overcharges (from the 80th centile upwards).21 To
show that our results are not sensitive to the choice of matching and weighting method, Column (4) offers
results using coarse exact matching (CEM), following [21].22 Column (5) reports QTE estimates when we
used inverse probability weights.23
The results discussed so far are based on the cartel episode as the unit of observation, because this
provides the large sample useful for the above distributional tests. However, we have also re-estimated all
equations using the individual cartel as the unit of observation, thereby side-stepping any problems with an
implicit assumption of independence of episodes within cartels. As an alternative, Columns (6)-(7) in Table
3 show the results of using the cartel as the unit of observation, with the mark-up measured as the average
across constituent episodes within the cartel. This reduces the sample size to a quarter of its original size,
but the substantive results remain statistically robust: the illegal sample has significantly less mass in its
tails, where here the lower tail is the bottom 15% and the upper tail is the top 30% of the distribution.24
In summary, these estimates confirm that low-overcharge cartels are significantly more frequent in legal
regimes, and high-overcharge cartels are also significantly more frequent under the legal regime. Both findings
are robust to the estimation method and unit of observation.
20Table D.7 in Appendix C contains the full results, including the coefficients for the covariates.
21Table D.6 also shows regression results for the four matching methods exposed in Figure C.4.
22As all our independent variables are dichotomous, the idea here is to create a group for each combination of our dichotomous
independent variables. For example, for the 10 independent dummy variables used in the paper this means 210 = 1024 possible
groups (bin). Legal and illegal cartels are then exactly matched within each of these bins (where both are available). We
derived weights through this matching and re-estimated the difference between the quantiles of the legal and illegal overcharge
distributions using these weights.
23Because we have some very small propensity scores - i.e. high inverse probabilities, we trimmed some of these observations.
We chose our cut-off point at the 6th and 94th percentiles, in order to match the sample size with Column (3) and provide
comparable results.
24Interestingly, the cartel level effect in the tails is even more pronounced if we exclude bid rigging cartels from our sample
– there are very few bid rigging cartels in the legal sample.
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4. Alternative explanations
In this section we reflect on the possibility that there may be alternative explanations which would
undermine our interpretation of these results.
4.1. Omitted variable bias
The central finding of the paper is that the enforcement of competition law is constraining cartel conduct.
The evidence in support of that finding is that the distribution of overcharges for illegal cartels has less
mass in the lower and upper tails compared to the overcharge distribution for legal cartels, which, by the
canonical theory of collusion, implies that competition law is deterring low-overcharge cartels from forming
and constraining the overcharges of those cartels that do form.
That argument presumes the set of illegal cartels is comparable to the set of legal cartels. While the
analysis using propensity scores established comparability for the variables in our data set, it is possible
there are omitted variables that systematically vary between legal and illegal cartels in such a way as to
offer an alternative explanation of the lower and upper tail results that does not involve constraining cartel
conduct.
On candidate for an omitted variable is the number of firms. Consider all-inclusive cartels and suppose
the overcharge is monotonic in the number of firms. If the distribution of the number of firms for illegal
cartels has less mass in the lower and upper tails compared to legal cartels, it follows that the overcharge
distribution for illegal cartels has less mass in the lower and upper tails. What is difficult is coming up with
an explanation for why illegal cartels would have fewer cartels with a small number of firms and fewer cartels
with a large number of firms, compared to legal cartels.
One possibility is that markets with few firms are less likely to have an illegal cartel because they can
tacitly collude, while firms in such markets would still choose to have a legal cartel. That would predict fewer
illegal cartels with a small number of firms relative to legal cartels. If the overcharge is decreasing in the
number of firms then it would explain the upper tail result for the overcharge distributions. However, that
theory does not explain the lower tail result. One could augment it with a second theory: Suppose cartels
are highly unstable in markets with many firms so duration is short and firms are almost indifferent about
cartelizing. As a result, firms do not form illegal cartels but still form legal cartels. That would explain the
lower tail result.25
25Another possibility is that illegality makes coordination more difficult, and that force is particularly acute when there are
many firms. That would predict fewer illegal cartels with many firms, relative to legal cartels. However, note that enforcement
is then impacting cartel formation and thus is consistent with our finding that enforcement is constraining cartels; it is just
that the mechanism is different from our theory. Hence, that type of alternative explanation does not alter the paper’s main
conclusion.
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While it is then possible to patch together an alternative theory to explain the lower tail result with a
second alternative theory to explain the upper tail result, an advantage of our theory is that it explains both
the lower and upper tail results, which is appealing from the perspective of parsimony.
4.2. Selection bias due to differential detection?
The above estimators are designed to correct for one potential source of bias - resulting from non-random
assignment of detected cartels. We now consider an alternative source – the possibility that detected (i.e.
observed) illegal cartels are a non-random sample from the population of all illegal cartels.
For this discussion, suppose initially that the enforcement of competition law did not, in fact, impact the
decision to form a cartel, nor the decision as to what price to charge; that is, firms act as if the probability
of being caught and convicted is approximately zero. In that case, the overcharge distribution for illegal
cartels would be the same as for legal cartels (conditional on covariates). If that were true, could selection
bias associated with the detection of illegal cartels produce our empirical finding? That would occur only
if the illegal cartels with low or high overcharges are less likely to be discovered than illegal cartels with
more moderate overcharges. We consider some possible sources of correlation between overcharges and the
likelihood of detection and assess whether they could offer an alternative explanation of our results.
Endogeneity of Discovery to the Overcharge. The possibility of a correlation between the likelihood of dis-
covery and the overcharge has already been recognised in our theoretical model, for it was assumed the
probability of detection and conviction is non-decreasing in price, σ′ (p) ≥ 0. If σ′ (p) >> 0 then illegal
cartels with a low price (and, therefore, low overcharge) are less likely to be in our sample, which could have
produced the lower tail property. That is, legal cartels are more likely to have low overcharges than illegal
cartels in our data set because illegal cartels with low overcharges are less likely to be discovered (and thus
to appear in the data set). However, this source of bias would not produce the upper tail result. If the
probability of detection is increasing in price then illegal cartels with high overcharges would be more likely
to be discovered in which case high overcharges would be more likely for cartels that are illegal, which runs
contrary to the evidence.
Cartel stability. Another source of bias is the presence of some third factor that causes overcharges and
discovery to be correlated. Suppose cartels vary in the probability of internal collapse, and let λ denote
the per-period probability of that event. It is shown in [17] that variation in λ across (illegal) cartels
creates selection bias in the sample of discovered cartels because more stable cartels are more likely to be
detected. The intuition is simple: The longer a cartel is alive, the more chances there are for it to be
uncovered by customers or the competition authority. Extending the theory in Section 1 to allow for an
22
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
exogenous probability of collapse λ, we have shown that the optimal collusive price is non-increasing in λ.
Not surprising, a lower value for λ means a more stable cartel which raises the collusive value which then
loosens the equilibrium condition and thus allows a higher collusive price to be supported. In sum, variation
across illegal cartels in the likelihood of internal collapse results in a positive correlation between the size of
the overcharge and the likelihood of detection (and thus appearing in the data set). The more stable cartels
have higher overcharges and are more likely to eventually be discovered because of their longer duration.
While there is then bias in the overcharge distribution for illegal cartels, for the same reasons as given above,
this bias is inconsistent with the upper tail result.26
Differential buyer power. As another possibility, suppose markets are heterogenous in buyer size; for example,
compare retail markets with many, small buyers and markets for intermediate goods with a few, large
buyers. Cartels operating in markets with large buyers could have a higher rate of detection (due to buyer
sophistication) and lower overcharges (due to buyer bargaining power). Hence, cartels in markets with small
buyers would be undersampled and, as they tend to have higher overcharges, this would produce the upper
tail result. However, there would not be the lower tail result because the cartels in markets with large buyers
would be oversampled and they have low overcharges. Again, there is an alternative explanation for one but
not both results.27
Competition authorities target high overcharge cases. Finally, a possible source of selection bias comes from
a competition authority’s decision as to which (suspected) cartels to prosecute. Prosecution bias is a concern
for our empirical analysis only if the likelihood of taking on a case depends on the overcharge. While one
might imagine that cases for which the overcharge is thought to be low may be less likely to be prosecuted,
that is unlikely for two reasons. First, competition authorities are probably more interested in avoiding
cases for which the probability of a conviction is low, and that probability is determined by the extent of
non-economic evidence concerning communications among firms rather than economic evidence pertaining
to overcharges. Second, it is very difficult to assess ex ante the size of the overcharge. Estimating overcharges
requires estimating the but for price which is a rather involved exercise. In sum, we do not think it is likely
26[17] show that this result is true even if internal collapse makes detection more likely. Let the probability of discovery be
ρ when the cartel is active and β when the cartel collapsed. First note that if β = 1 (so collapse implies discovery for sure),
then the population of discovered cartels is the same as the population of all cartels because, eventually, every cartel either is
discovered or collapses (and is then discovered); hence, there is no selection bias. When β < 1, the population of discovered
cartels is a biased sample of the population of cartels. However, as long as the inter-cartel variation in the rate of internal
collapse λ is sufficiently larger than the variation in the likelihoods of discovery ρ and β (which seems plausible as λ is driven by
industry-specific factors, while ρ and β are influenced by a common enforcement policy) then [17] show there is an over-sampling
of the most stable cartels. As the most stable cartels have the highest overcharges, selection bias results in an oversampling of
high-overcharge illegal cartels which works against the upper tail result.
27One could also imagine that the overcharge is higher for cartels in markets with large buyers because bargaining power
depresses the but for price. In that case, the detection bias produces the lower tail result but not the upper tail result.
23
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
that competition authorities tend to avoid prosecuting cartels with low overcharges. And, even if that was
the case, this source of bias would at most be consistent with the lower tail result, and would run against
finding evidence for the upper tail result.
In summary, while the data set of discovered illegal cartels is most likely a biased sample, we were
unable to devise a mechanism that would cause (observed) illegal cartels to be less likely to have both low
overcharges and high overcharges compared to legal cartels. Based on the analysis of this section and the
preceding section, we believe the most plausible explanation for our empirical finding is that illegal cartels are
acting as if there is some prospect of being caught and penalised, and thus are being deterred or constrained
by the existence and enforcement of a competition law prohibiting collusion.
4.3. Measurement errors in the data
Connor’s database is singular in terms of both its breadth and scale, and it offers our only option if
we wish to employ a large sample of legal cartels with which to describe the counterfactual – what would
happen, absent cartel prohibition. However, this database has been criticized for the quality of some of the
overcharge estimates especially where the reliability of the primary sources is difficult to assess.28 One can
imagine a plausible explanation of our results, accounting for the greater frequency of high overcharge cartels
in the legal sample. This might occur if there is more measurement error in the overcharge estimates for legal
cartels – perhaps because they are not so often studied in detail and are never verified by courts, or because
only large and possibly inflated overcharge estimates attract attention and get published when cartels are
legal. If so, a greater variance (noise) in the legal estimates could produce greater frequencies in the tails
where measurement errors sometimes lead to spuriously smaller or larger estimates of the overcharge.
To accommodate this line of criticism, we have screened the database to include only estimates whose
primary sources were published in peer-reviewed academic journals and books.29 The results are in Table 4
in Appendix C. Though it reduces the sample size typically by about one half, results remain qualitatively
unchanged. Estimated coefficients generally remain robustly significant, with the exception of the upper tail
for the IPW weighted estimator.
5. Conclusion
One of the central issues regarding competition policy is whether the enforcement of anti-cartel laws has
been effective in deterring and constraining cartels. Are the efforts of competition authorities causing some
cartels not to form? For those cartels that do form, is enforcement causing them to limit their price increases?
28See for example [28], and [5].
29More details on these journals and estimates are given in [8].
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These questions are as challenging as they are important because we do not observe deterred cartels and
it is very difficult to assess what prices a cartel would have charged had there not been enforcement. In
light of the almost total absence of empirical analysis addressing these questions, this paper contributes by
providing an innovative approach rooted in the canonical theory of collusion and then implementing it using
historical data on legal and illegal cartels. The approach delivers the first broad evidence that competition
policy is providing effective in deterring some cartels from forming and constraining the overcharges of the
cartels that do form.
Using the theory of collusion, we have shown that if competition policy is effective then low-overcharge
cartels will be deterred from forming because the expected penalty makes them unstable and unprofitable. In
addition, high-overcharge cartels are also less likely to be observed because effective anti-cartel enforcement
will tend to destabilize collusion and that will force colluding firms to limit their price increases. Thus
the theory predicts that a well-functioning competition policy will manifest itself with fewer low-overcharge
cartels and fewer high-overcharge cartels.
The empirical contribution derives from a novel comparison of the distributions of overcharges for cartels
subject to competition law and enforcement and those that were not. Consistent with the predicted impact
of effective competition policy coming from the theory, the overcharge distribution for illegal cartels is found
to have less mass in both the lower and upper tails compared to the distribution for legal cartels. This finding
is robust when we control for the time periods, jurisdictions and industries in which the cartels occurred.
These results may have important implications for assessing the welfare effects of competition law and
enforcement. The benefits from enforcement are typically seen as the elimination of the overcharge for those
years that the cartel would have operated had the competition authority not discovered and convicted it.30
Our analysis suggests that these benefits have been underestimated. First, the presence of a competition
authority may have caused the cartel to set a lower overcharge, in which case consumers would have faced
an even higher price had there not been enforcement. Second, some cartels are deterred from forming and
that is another unmeasured welfare gain. While the latter has previously been recognised, our study is one
of the few to provide evidence that it is occurring.31
Nevertheless, our empirical contribution should not be overstated at this stage. What we have shown is
a robustly significant difference between historical legal and illegal cartels in the tails of their distributions.
What is contestable is that this difference is necessarily attributable to effective deterrence, rather than some
other unobserved (by us) factors which differed between these two samples, beyond the issue of legality. It
30See for example OFT (2010, p.17).
31[9] present a framework for using the information on the tails in order to calibrate the relative magnitude of deterred and
undetected cartel harm.
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is not obvious what these variables might be, or why they should impact on both tails of the distribution,
but we cannot exclude the possibility. For this reason, although we view our evidence as important because
this is a subject where little has been previously quantified, it is preliminary, rather than conclusive. Future
empirical work is clearly called for, perhaps using alternative approaches to constructing the counterfactual.
6. Appendix
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us first show that, with or without competition law, the optimal collusive price is bounded above by
pm. Taking the first derivative of the collusive value with respect to price and simplifying, we derive:
∂V c(p)
∂p
(A.1)
=
[1− δ(1− σ (p))]pi′ (p)− (1− δ)F (p)σ′ (p)− [pi (p)− pin] δσ′ (p)− [1− δ(1− σ (p))]σ (p)F ′(p)
[1− δ(1− σ (p))]2
By the strict quasi-concavity of pi (p) , σ′ (p) ≥ 0, and F ′(p) ≥ 0,
∂V c(p)
∂p
< 0 ∀p > pm. (A.2)
Next consider the ICC in (3). Given that pi (p) is non-increasing in p ∀p ≥ pm, pid (p) is increasing in p
∀p, and (1 − θ)σ (p)F (p) is non-decreasing in p ∀p then the RHS of (3) is increasing in p ∀p ≥ pm. Given
V c(p) is decreasing in p ∀p > pm and σ(p) is non-decreasing in p then the LHS of (3) is decreasing in p
∀p > pm. Hence, if the ICC holds for some po > pm then it holds ∀p ∈ [pm, po] . This property allows us
to conclude that the optimal collusive price is bounded above by pm. For suppose not so that the optimal
collusive price is p∗ > pm. Given that V c(p) is decreasing in price at p = p∗ by (A.2) and the ICC holds
∀p ∈ [pm, p∗] then the cartel strictly prefers a lower price to p∗ which is a contradiction. From hereon, we
can focus our attention on collusive prices no higher than pm.
Let us prove (iii). If p∗L < p
m then the ICC is violated for a legal cartel at collusive prices above p∗L :
δ
(
pi (p)
1− δ − V
n
)
5 pid (p)− pi (p) as p = p∗L, for p ∈ [p∗L, pm] . (A.3)
Because the LHS of (3) is strictly less than the LHS of (A.3) and the RHS of (3) is weakly greater than the
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RHS of (A.3), (A.3) implies that the ICC for an illegal cartel is violated at collusive prices at or above p∗L:
δ(1−σ (p))
(
pi (p)− σ (p)F (p) + δσ (p)V n
1− δ(1− σ (p)) − V
n
)
< pid (p)−pi (p)+(1−θ)σ (p)F (p) ∀p ∈ [p∗L, pm] . (A.4)
It follows that p∗I < p
∗
L.
Next let us prove (ii). Examining (A.1), if σ′ (pm) > 0 then it follows from the strict quasi-concavity and
continuous differentiability of pi (p) and the continuous differentiability of σ (p) and F (p) that ∃ε > 0 such
that
∂V c(p)
∂p
< 0 ∀p ∈ [pm − ε, pm] .
Return to the ICC in (3). Given pi (p) is non-increasing in p ∀p ≥ pm, pid (p) is increasing in p, and
(1−θ)σ (p)F (p) is non-decreasing in p then, by the continuous differentiability of pi (p), ∃ε > 0 such that the
RHS of (3) is increasing in p ∀p ∈ [pm − ε, pm] . Given V c(p) is decreasing in p at p = pm and σ(p) and F (p)
are non-decreasing in p then, by the continuous differentiability of V c(p), ∃ε > 0 such that the LHS of (3) is
decreasing in p ∀p ∈ [pm − ε, pm]. Hence, if (3) holds for p = pm then it holds ∀p ∈ [pm − ε, pm]. It follows
that: If σ′ (pm) > 0 then p∗I < p
m. For suppose not and the optimal collusive price is instead pm. By setting
a slightly lower price, the collusive value is higher and the ICC is still satisfied which is a contradiction.
Given σ′ (pm) > 0 implies p∗I < p
m, (ii) can be proved. If, at the optimal collusive price, the ICC does
not bind for a legal cartel then p∗L = p
m and, given we’ve shown p∗I < p
m, we have p∗I < p
∗
L. If instead the
ICC does bind for a legal cartel then p∗L < p
m in which case p∗I < p
∗
L follows from (iii).
Finally, property (i) is immediate. If p∗L < p
m then p∗I < p
∗
L follows from (iii). If p
∗
L = p
m then p∗I ≤ p∗L
follows from p∗I ≤ pm.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first show that p∗
L
= pn (which is well-known but a proof is provided for completeness). When
σ(p) = 0 ∀p, the ICC in (3) for a legal cartel can be simplified and re-arranged to:
(
δ
1− δ
)(
pi (p)− pin
pid (p)− pi (p)
)
≥ 1. (A.5)
Consider the LHS of (A.5) as the collusive price converges to the competitive price, and apply l’Hoˆpital’s
rule,
lim
p→pn
(
δ
1− δ
)(
pi (p)− pin
pid (p)− pi (p)
)
= lim
p→pn
(
δ
1− δ
)(
dpi (p) /dp
(dpid (p) /dp)− (dpi (p) /dp)
)
. (A.6)
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Define the best response function,
ψi(p−i) ≡ arg maxpi pii
(
pi, p−i
)
,
and perform the following steps on (A.6):
lim
p→pn
(
δ
1− δ
)(
dpi (p) /dp
(dpid (p) /dp)− (dpi (p) /dp)
)
= lim
p→pn
(
δ
1− δ
)
× ∑nj=1
(
∂pii(p,(p,...,p))
∂pj
)
(
∂pii(ψi(p,...,p),(p,...,p))
∂pi
)∑
j 6=i
(
∂ψi(p,...,p)
∂pj
)
+
∑n
j 6=i
(
∂pii(ψi(p,...,p),(p,...,p))
∂pj
)
−∑nj=1 (∂pii(p,(p,...,p))∂pj )

= lim
p→pn
(
δ
1− δ
) ∑nj=1
(
∂pii(p,(p,...,p))
∂pj
)
∑
j 6=i
(
∂pii(ψi(p,...,p),(p,...,p))
∂pj
)
−∑nj=1 (∂pii(p,(p,...,p))∂pj )

=
(
δ
1− δ
) ∑nj=1
(
∂pii(p
n,(pn,...,pn))
∂pj
)
∑
j 6=i
(
∂pii(ψi(pn,...,pn),(pn,...,pn))
∂pj
)
−∑nj=1 (∂pii(pn,(pn,...,pn))∂pj )

=
(
δ
1− δ
) ∑j 6=i
(
∂pii(p
n,(pn,...,pn))
∂pj
)
∑
j 6=i
(
∂pii(pn,(pn,...,pn))
∂pj
)
−∑j 6=i (∂pii(pn,(pn,...,pn))∂pj )
 = +∞.
Thus, if δ > 0 then (A.5) holds for some p > pn which means a legal cartel can always sustain a collusive
price. However, as we’ll show next, the collusive price must be close to the competitive price when δ is close
to zero. The ICC is re-arranged to
δ [pi (p)− pin] ≥ (1− δ) [pid (p)− pi (p)] . (A.7)
As δ → 0, the LHS goes to zero. Hence, (A.7) can only hold if the RHS converges to zero which implies
p → pn. In sum, when collusion is legal and δ > 0, there exists an optimal collusive price exceeding the
competitive price pn though the optimal collusive price can be arbitrarily close to pn. For a legal cartel, the
infimum for the collusive price is pn.
Turning to the case of illegal collusion, a necessary condition for (3) to hold is V c(p) > V n. Note that
lim
p→pn V
c(p) = lim
p→pn
pi (p)− σ(p)F (p) + δσ(p)V n
1− δ(1− σ(p)) =
pin − σ(pn)F (pn) + δσ(pn)V n
1− δ(1− σ(pn))
=
(1− δ)V n − σ(pn)F (pn) + δσ(pn)V n
1− δ(1− σ(pn)) = V
n − σ(p
n)F (pn)
1− δ(1− σ(pn)) < V
n,
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because σ(pn)F (pn) > 0. Given that the ICC for an illegal cartel is violated when the collusive price is
sufficiently close to pn, it follows that there is a lower bound on the collusive price that exceeds pn. For an
illegal cartel, the infimum for the collusive price exceeds pn.
Appendix B. Numerical analysis
Consider a duopoly that offers symmetrically differentiated products. A representative consumer chooses
quantities to maximize net surplus:
max
(q1,q2)
aq1 + aq2 −
(
1
2
)(
bq21 + bq
2
2 + 2dq1q2
)− p1q1 − p2q2,
where a, b > 0, d ∈ (0, b) . The first-order conditions yield the inverse demand functions:
∂U
∂q1
= a− bq1 − dq2 − p1 = 0⇔ P1 (q1, q2) = a− bq1 − dq2
∂U
∂q2
= a− bq2 − dq1 − p2 = 0⇔ P2 (q1, q2) = a− bq2 − dq1
which can be inverted to derive the demand functions for firms 1 and 2, respectively,
(
1
b2 − d2
)
[a(b− d)− bp1 + dp2]
(
1
b2 − d2
)
[a(b− d)− bp2 + dp1] .
However, these demand functions are relevant only as long as both are positive. Taking account of corner
solutions, firm 1’s demand function is
D1 (p1, p2) =
 max
{(
1
b2−d2
)
[a(b− d)− bp1 + dp2] , 0
}
if 1d (bp2 − a (b− d)) ≤ p1(
1
b
)
(a− p1) if p1 < 1d (bp2 − a (b− d))
and firm 2’s demand function is analogously defined.
Each firm has a common marginal cost c ∈ [0, a) . The Nash equilibrium price is pn ≡ a(b−d)+bc2b−d and the
joint profit-maximizing price is pm ≡ (b−d)(a+c)2(b−d) . Conditional on the probability of detection σ, the optimal
collusive price p∗(σ) is defined by:
• ICC is not binding: If δ(1− σ) [V c(pm)− V n] ≥ pid(pm)− pi(pm) then p∗(σ) = pm.
• ICC is binding: If δ(1 − σ) [V c(pm)− V n] < pid(pm) − pi(pm) and ∃p ∈ (pn, pm) such that δ(1 −
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σ) [V c(p)− V n] ≥ pid(p)− pi(p) then
p∗(σ) = max
{
p ∈ (pn, pm) : δ(1− σ) [V c(p)− V n] = pid (p)− pi (p)} .
If σ > 0 then p∗(σ) may not exist because collusion is not sustainable.
Set (a, b) = (1, 1) and F = pim/2 = (a−c)
2
8(b+d) . Let TN(µ, s) denote a truncated normal distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation s. Randomly select (c, d, δ) according to the following distributions: c ∼
TN(0.35, 0.1) with support [0, 1], d ∼ TN(0.5, 0.1) with support [0.1, 0.9], and δ ∼ TN(0.35, 0.1) with
support [0.01, 0.99].32 Given a draw on (c, d, δ), calculate pn, p∗(0), p∗(0.05) and the legal and illegal
overcharges. Kernel estimation is performed on a data set of overcharges from 100,000 random draws on
(c, d, δ).
Appendix C. Matching explained
There are a number of ways that matching can be effected. Figure C.4 compares the empirical distribution
of propensity scores (estimated in a logit model33) for the unmatched and the matched samples, in order to
visually identify the matching method that generates a counterfactual (illegal regime) that is closest to the
treatment (legal regime). Each panel shows that the density curves (frequency) of the propensity scores. The
top left panel begins with the propensity scores without matching. It suggests that the overlap assumption
(similar covariate distribution for the two groups) is likely to be violated especially at the lower end of
propensity scores (this is as expected, as there are many more illegal cases in our sample, many of which
are different in their observed characteristics from the legal observations). The top right panel shows 1-on-1
matching without replacement in the matched sample. Here propensity scores for 364 legal cartel episodes
are sorted in descending order and are matched with 364 illegal cartel episodes with the highest propensity
scores. The rest of the sample is discarded. This achieves little improvement - there are many more legal
cases with high propensity scores and more illegal cases with low propensity scores, suggesting that there is
a limited number of illegal cartel episodes that match in their characteristics to legal cartel episodes.
The situation improves with 1-on-1 matching with replacement (bottom left panel). In this case those
illegal cartel episodes that are most similar to legal cartel episodes are matched with many legal cartel
episodes. This method does not limit the number of times an illegal observation can be paired with an legal
32Given that the probability of detection is independent of the collusive price, the upper tail result (Prop. 1) occurs only
when the ICC is binding; that is, the expected penalty reduces the collusive value which tightens the ICC which then requires
the collusive price to be lowered. So that the upper tail result is visually observable, the discount factor is kept low in order
for the ICC to generally bind. More plausible values for the discount factor could be specified if the probability of detection is
assumed to be increasing in the collusive price. In that case, the upper tail result occurs even when the ICC is not binding.
33The coefficients of the propensity score generating equation are given in Table D.5 in Appendix C.
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Figure C.4: Legal/illegal propensity scores by matching type
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Matched with ties
one. As a result, 364 legal cartel episodes are matched with the most similar 26 illegal episodes. However,
1-on-1 matching still ignores the fact that there is potentially a large number of ties (e.g. where one illegal
observation can be matched with more than one legal observation), because we are matching based on
categorical variables. For this reason we also looked at matching with ties. Using ties with replacement
means that each legal cartel can be matched with multiple illegal cartels and vice versa (in our sample we
match 364 legal cartel episodes with 565 illegal episodes of varying weight).34 The bottom right panel of
Figure C.4 shows that the weighted matched (with ties) sample offers a good match between legal and illegal
cases, and this is therefore our preferred choice.
Appendix D. Tables
34The smallest weight is 0.07 (272 illegal episodes are matched with this weight) and the highest is 20.2 (5 illegal episodes).
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5th 0 -2.300*** 0 0 0
(0.471) (0.588) (0.579) (.) (2.665)
10th -5*** -5.650*** -4.600*** 0 -5**
(1.099) (1.070) (0.947) (0.686) (2.501)
15th -6.500*** -7.250*** -7*** -4*** -7.900***
(1.039) (1.494) (0.785) (1.276) (2.481)
20th -5.700*** -7.800*** -6.100*** -4.800*** -8.900***
(1.402) (1.697) (1.038) (1.186) (2.586)
25th -3.900** -6.900*** -3.200** -2.700* -8.700***
(1.885) (1.900) (1.579) (1.441) (2.618)
30th -2.600 -7.450*** -4.600** -1.900 -8.800***
(1.892) (2.210) (1.952) (1.640) (2.829)
35th -1.900 -5.300** -6.700*** -2 -6.200**
(1.994) (2.644) (2.153) (1.817) (2.902)
40th 0.600 -5.400* -5.700** -0.200 -8.500***
(2.378) (3.093) (2.342) (2.051) (3.138)
45th 0.200 -3.500 -2.500 -1.500 -7**
(2.246) (3.311) (2.271) (1.790) (3.526)
50th 4 -2.600 -4.100* 2.600 -6.600*
(2.614) (3.380) (2.260) (1.984) (3.637)
55th 5* -1.600 -2.500 4.500** -4.600
(2.835) (3.337) (2.718) (2.153) (3.944)
60th 4.600 -3 -3.500 5.800** -4.600
(2.891) (3.848) (2.723) (2.447) (4.114)
65th 7.500** -2.500 -3 7.500*** -7
(3.378) (4.133) (3.354) (2.895) (4.394)
70th 12.80*** 0 0 9.500** -4.800
(4.281) (5.648) (4.381) (3.866) (4.949)
75th 13.10*** 4.800 0 10*** -3
(4.880) (6.062) (4.736) (3.796) (6.871)
80th 23*** 11.35 4.200 18*** 4.300
(7.104) (9.788) (6.351) (5.318) (7.893)
85th 38*** 26* 22.10** 36*** 15.00
(11.29) (14.48) (10.76) (8.329) (13.51)
90th 78*** 53.45** 62*** 80*** 28.40
(21.42) (26.79) (20.54) (17.30) (23.73)
95th 159.4*** 114* 102.5*** 162.4*** 123*
(33.09) (68.84) (31.33) (27.57) (66.24)
N 730 730 586 730 730
standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table D.5: Logit regression results used for propensity scores
Pre-1945 cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) 3.861***
(0.215)
US cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) 0.132
(0.387)
European cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -0.481
(0.383)
Asian cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) 1.093**
(0.492)
Global cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -0.0676
(0.410)
Bid Rigging cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -0.933**
(0.378)
Manufacturing cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -1.284***
(0.401)
Raw materials cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -2.382***
(0.452)
Services cartel (1 - Yes, 0 - No) -1.683***
(0.573)
Observations 1419
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
Benchmarks for each category
Geographical: rest of the world
Cartel type: non bid rigging
Industry: other industries (transp, constr.)
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Table D.6: Quantile regression results for the four matched samples shown in Figure 4
Quantiles (1) (2) (3) (5)
5th -2.200 0 -4.600 -3
(1.482) (.) (.) (54.40)
10th -4.600*** -4*** -4.600*** -5.600***
(0.964) (1.040) (0.536) (0.672)
15th -5.700*** -4.700*** -4 -4.900***
(0.990) (0.976) (13.94) (1.708)
20th -5.500*** -4.400*** -6.500 -5.400*
(1.424) (1.376) (12.71) (3.196)
25th -4.800*** -2.900 -9.800 -2.900
(1.263) (1.856) (25.57) (4.715)
30th -5.600*** -1.600 -21.50 -5.500
(1.735) (1.929) (19.41) (6.440)
35th -5.500** -0.200 -18.20 -7.900
(2.294) (2.161) (12.63) (6.808)
40th -4.300 0.100 -15 -8
(2.793) (2.504) (15.97) (5.715)
45th -1.800 2 -10 -6
(2.628) (2.482) (13.88) (5.257)
50th -1.000 5* -5.600 -4.200
(2.790) (2.601) (13.79) (5.332)
55th -1 5 -20 -6
(2.839) (3.103) (14.01) (4.803)
60th -0.600 6.200* -16 -4
(3.286) (3.311) (17.92) (5.267)
65th 0.300 7.800** -10* 1
(3.525) (3.730) (5.629) (6.237)
70th 3.800 15.30*** 0 6
(4.511) (4.709) (6.429) (6.868)
75th 7.500 17*** 0.500 4.500
(4.923) (4.991) (7.588) (6.931)
80th 15.90* 24.80*** 13.90 17.90**
(8.518) (7.999) (8.820) (8.542)
85th 34.10*** 46.50*** 41** 41.00**
(12.87) (17.20) (18.15) (17.31)
90th 77.60*** 106*** 107.5*** 97.80***
(28.49) (29.00) (25.92) (31.16)
95th 171.6*** 174*** 201.5*** 173.4***
(27.60) (53.13) (54.40) (58.53)
N 1497 736 390 1008
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
34
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
T
a
b
le
D
.7
:
R
es
u
lt
s
o
f
th
e
m
u
lt
iv
a
ri
a
te
q
u
a
n
ti
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
q
5
q
1
0
q
1
5
q
2
0
q
25
q
30
q
35
q
40
q
45
q
50
q
5
5
q
6
0
q
6
5
q
7
0
q
7
5
q
80
q
8
5
q
9
0
q
9
5
L
eg
a
l
-2
.2
00
*
*
-4
.6
0
0*
*
*
-5
.7
0
0
**
*
-5
.5
0
0
**
*
-4
.8
0
0*
**
-5
.6
00
**
*
-5
.5
00
*
**
-4
.3
0
0*
-1
.8
0
0
-1
.0
0
0
-1
-0
.6
0
0
0.
3
00
3.
8
00
7.
0
00
15
.9
0
*
*
3
4
.1
0
**
*
77
.6
0
**
*
17
1.
6
**
*
(1
.0
0
1
)
(1
.2
73
)
(1
.3
64
)
(1
.3
59
)
(1
.2
6
8)
(1
.6
2
0)
(1
.9
78
)
(2
.1
98
)
(2
.2
4
3)
(2
.5
01
)
(2
.7
4
5)
(3
.0
00
)
(3
.2
5
4)
(3
.9
21
)
(5
.0
0
1)
(7
.6
12
)
(1
0
.0
2
)
(1
7.
1
9)
(2
5
.2
0
)
P
re
1
94
5
0
0
.9
0
0
1.
7
00
2.
30
0
*
3.
00
0*
*
5
.6
00
**
*
6.
80
0*
**
8
.6
0
0*
**
8
.8
0
0*
*
*
10
.7
0
**
*
11
.3
0
**
*
13
.3
0
**
*
16
*
**
16
.5
0
**
*
16
.9
0
**
*
14
.5
0
*
1
7.
5
0*
1
6
.6
0
4.
80
0
(0
.9
9
7
)
(1
.2
67
)
(1
.3
58
)
(1
.3
53
)
(1
.2
6
3)
(1
.6
1
3)
(1
.9
70
)
(2
.1
88
)
(2
.2
3
3)
(2
.4
90
)
(2
.7
3
3)
(2
.9
87
)
(3
.2
4
0)
(3
.9
04
)
(4
.9
7
9)
(7
.5
79
)
(9
.9
73
)
(1
7.
1
1)
(2
5
.0
9
)
U
S
-0
.7
0
0
-0
.0
0
00
0
0
23
8
1
2.
20
0
1
.6
0
0
2.
70
0
0.
90
0
1
.3
0
0
2
0
.8
0
0
1
.8
0
0
3
.5
0
0
3.
5
00
5.
5
00
10
.4
0
10
.9
0
1
1
1
3.
2
0
2
0
(1
.6
1
9
)
(2
.0
59
)
(2
.2
07
)
(2
.1
99
)
(2
.0
5
2)
(2
.6
2
1)
(3
.2
01
)
(3
.5
55
)
(3
.6
2
8)
(4
.0
47
)
(4
.4
4
1)
(4
.8
54
)
(5
.2
6
5)
(6
.3
44
)
(8
.0
9
2)
(1
2
.3
2
)
(1
6
.2
1
)
(2
7.
8
0)
(4
0
.7
8
)
E
U
0.
30
0
0
.9
00
1
.7
0
0
3.
70
0
*
2.
90
0
3
.3
00
0.
90
0
0
.8
0
0
1
.7
0
0
-0
.2
0
0
2.
1
00
4.
2
00
6.
2
00
7
.2
0
0
8
.6
0
0
1
2.
9
0
15
20
.2
0
42
.4
0
(1
.5
8
6
)
(2
.0
17
)
(2
.1
62
)
(2
.1
54
)
(2
.0
1
0)
(2
.5
6
8)
(3
.1
36
)
(3
.4
83
)
(3
.5
5
4)
(3
.9
64
)
(4
.3
5
0)
(4
.7
55
)
(5
.1
5
7)
(6
.2
15
)
(7
.9
2
6)
(1
2
.0
6
)
(1
5
.8
7
)
(2
7.
2
4)
(3
9
.9
4
)
A
si
a
-1
.9
00
0
.6
0
0
4.
25
0
*
5.
20
0
**
5
.0
00
**
5.
4
00
*
3
.4
00
3.
1
00
3
.9
0
0
2
.5
0
0
1
.9
0
0
3
.8
0
0
7
.2
0
0
8.
5
00
16
*
20
.4
0
3
0.
5
0
3
5.
8
0
7
9
.1
0*
(1
.8
8
2
)
(2
.3
93
)
(2
.5
65
)
(2
.5
56
)
(2
.3
8
5)
(3
.0
4
7)
(3
.7
21
)
(4
.1
33
)
(4
.2
1
7)
(4
.7
04
)
(5
.1
6
2)
(5
.6
42
)
(6
.1
1
9)
(7
.3
74
)
(9
.4
0
5)
(1
4
.3
2
)
(1
8
.8
4
)
(3
2.
3
2)
(4
7
.4
0
)
G
lo
b
a
l
1
.1
0
0
5.
30
0
*
*
6
.9
0
0*
*
*
8
.7
0
0*
*
*
8
.6
0
0*
**
9.
20
0*
**
6.
6
00
**
7
.5
0
0*
*
8
.8
0
0*
*
7
.5
0
0
*
8.
6
00
*
9.
8
00
**
11
.5
0
**
11
.2
0
*
1
3.
7
0*
1
5.
9
0
19
.4
0
30
.6
0
34
.5
0
(1
.6
4
9
)
(2
.0
97
)
(2
.2
48
)
(2
.2
39
)
(2
.0
9
0)
(2
.6
6
9)
(3
.2
60
)
(3
.6
21
)
(3
.6
9
5)
(4
.1
21
)
(4
.5
2
3)
(4
.9
44
)
(5
.3
6
2)
(6
.4
61
)
(8
.2
4
1)
(1
2
.5
4
)
(1
6
.5
0
)
(2
8.
3
2)
(4
1
.5
3
)
B
id
ri
gg
in
g
0
0
0
.9
50
1.
50
0
0
.7
00
0.
50
0
1
.1
00
1
.4
0
0
0
.9
0
0
-0
.2
0
0
-0
.7
00
-1
.8
0
0
-0
.5
0
0
-0
.1
0
0
-3
.7
00
-5
-0
.8
0
0
-1
.4
0
0
-9
.6
0
0
(0
.9
8
9
)
(1
.2
58
)
(1
.3
48
)
(1
.3
43
)
(1
.2
5
4)
(1
.6
0
1)
(1
.9
55
)
(2
.1
72
)
(2
.2
1
7)
(2
.4
72
)
(2
.7
1
3)
(2
.9
65
)
(3
.2
1
6)
(3
.8
76
)
(4
.9
4
3)
(7
.5
24
)
(9
.9
00
)
(1
6.
9
9)
(2
4
.9
1
)
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
-3
.4
00
*
*
-4
.2
00
*
*
-3
.1
0
0
-1
.5
00
-2
.5
00
-1
.9
00
0.
50
0
1
.7
0
0
2
.8
0
0
0.
1
00
0
0
.3
0
0
-1
.6
00
-3
.3
0
0
-2
.6
00
0
6
.7
0
0
1
1.
2
0
6
.7
0
0
(1
.6
5
6
)
(2
.1
05
)
(2
.2
57
)
(2
.2
48
)
(2
.0
9
8)
(2
.6
8
0)
(3
.2
73
)
(3
.6
36
)
(3
.7
1
0)
(4
.1
38
)
(4
.5
4
1)
(4
.9
63
)
(5
.3
8
3)
(6
.4
87
)
(8
.2
7
4)
(1
2
.5
9
)
(1
6
.5
7
)
(2
8.
4
3)
(4
1
.6
9
)
R
aw
m
a
te
ri
a
ls
-4
.6
0
0
**
*
-5
.1
0
0
**
-3
.1
00
-2
.1
00
-2
.6
00
-1
.7
0
0
1.
10
0
1
.8
0
0
2
.2
0
0
0
.1
0
0
-0
.1
0
0
-1
.6
0
0
-3
.3
00
-5
.8
0
0
-5
.2
00
-3
.5
0
0
2
.6
00
1
4
14
.7
0
(1
.7
7
3
)
(2
.2
54
)
(2
.4
16
)
(2
.4
07
)
(2
.2
4
7)
(2
.8
7
0)
(3
.5
05
)
(3
.8
93
)
(3
.9
7
3)
(4
.4
31
)
(4
.8
6
2)
(5
.3
15
)
(5
.7
6
4)
(6
.9
46
)
(8
.8
5
9)
(1
3
.4
8
)
(1
7
.7
4
)
(3
0.
4
4)
(4
4
.6
4
)
T
ra
n
sp
or
ta
ti
o
n
-1
.3
0
0
-4
-2
.2
00
-2
.6
00
-3
.3
00
-2
.0
00
1.
50
0
0
.5
0
0
0
-4
.5
0
0
-6
.6
00
-7
.0
0
0
-1
-4
.3
00
-1
0.
8
0
-8
.4
00
-7
.5
00
-4
.8
0
0
-2
7
.4
0
(2
.3
6
3
)
(3
.0
05
)
(3
.2
21
)
(3
.2
09
)
(2
.9
9
5)
(3
.8
2
5)
(4
.6
71
)
(5
.1
89
)
(5
.2
9
5)
(5
.9
06
)
(6
.4
8
1)
(7
.0
84
)
(7
.6
8
3)
(9
.2
59
)
(1
1.
8
1)
(1
7
.9
7
)
(2
3
.6
5
)
(4
0.
5
8)
(5
9
.5
1
)
S
er
v
ic
es
-2
.9
0
0
-5
.8
0
0*
*
-3
.4
00
-0
.4
00
0.
60
0
3.
00
0
3.
6
00
3.
6
00
4.
7
00
2
.8
00
8
18
.1
0
**
*
22
.3
0
*
**
2
8.
1
0*
**
3
2.
1
0*
**
6
7*
**
9
9.
2
0*
*
*
1
1
7.
2
**
*
17
7.
9
**
*
(1
.9
6
7
)
(2
.5
01
)
(2
.6
81
)
(2
.6
71
)
(2
.4
9
3)
(3
.1
8
4)
(3
.8
89
)
(4
.3
19
)
(4
.4
0
8)
(4
.9
16
)
(5
.3
9
5)
(5
.8
97
)
(6
.3
9
6)
(7
.7
07
)
(9
.8
3
0)
(1
4
.9
6
)
(1
9
.6
9
)
(3
3.
7
8)
(4
9
.5
4
)
C
on
st
a
n
t
5
.3
0
0*
*
7
.9
0
0*
*
*
7
.1
0
0*
*
6
.3
0
0*
*
8
.9
0
0*
**
8.
70
0*
*
10
.5
0*
*
10
.8
0
*
*
1
1.
4
0*
*
1
7.
4
0*
**
1
8.
9
0*
**
1
9.
9
0*
*
*
2
2
.1
0
**
*
25
.8
0
**
*
2
7
.3
0
**
28
.1
0
*
2
5.
8
0
2
4.
2
0
4
2.
9
0
(2
.1
5
8
)
(2
.7
44
)
(2
.9
41
)
(2
.9
30
)
(2
.7
3
5)
(3
.4
9
3)
(4
.2
66
)
(4
.7
39
)
(4
.8
3
6)
(5
.3
93
)
(5
.9
1
9)
(6
.4
69
)
(7
.0
1
6)
(8
.4
55
)
(1
0.
7
8)
(1
6
.4
1
)
(2
1
.6
0
)
(3
7.
0
6)
(5
4
.3
4
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
14
9
7
1
49
7
1
4
97
14
9
7
1
4
97
1
49
7
14
97
14
97
1
49
7
1
49
7
14
97
14
97
1
49
7
14
9
7
14
97
1
49
7
1
49
7
1
49
7
14
9
7
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
*
p
<
0.
1
0
**
p
<
0
.0
5
*
**
p
<
0
.0
1
35
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
References
[1] Armoogum, K. P., Davies, S., Mariuzzo, F., 2017. Cartel enforcement and deterrence over the life of a
competition authority.
[2] Bageri, V., Katsoulacos, Y., Spagnolo, G., 2013. The distortive effects of antitrust fines based on revenue.
The Economic Journal 123 (572), 545–557.
[3] Block, M. K., Nold, F. C., Sidak, G. J., 1981. The deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement. Journal of
Political Economy 89 (3), 429–445.
[4] Bolotova, Y. V., 2009. Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 70 (1-2), 321–341.
[5] Boyer, M., Kotchoni, R., 2015. How much do cartel overcharge? Review of Industrial Organization
47 (2), 119–153.
[6] Brenner, S., 2009. An empirical study of the european corporate leniency program. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 27 (6), 639–645.
[7] CMA, 2017. Competition and markets authority: Deterrent effect of competition authorities’ work.
[8] Connor, J. M., 2014. Price-fixing overcharges: Revised 3rd edition. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400780.
[9] Davies, S., Mariuzzo, F., Ormosi, P., 2018. Quantifying the deterrent effect of anti-cartel enforcement.
Economic Inquiry forthcoming.
[10] Davies, S., Ormosi, P. L., Graffenberger, M., 2015. Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel
breakdown. The Journal of Law and Economics 58 (3), 561–583.
[11] Dong, A., Massa, M., Zaldokas, A., 2016. Busted! now what? effects of cartel enforcement on firm value
and corporate policies. CEPR DP11470.
[12] Firpo, S., 2007. Efficient semiparametric estimation of quantile treatment effects. Econometrica 75 (1),
259–276.
[13] Harrington, J. E., 2004. Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority. The RAND
Journal of Economics 35 (4), 651–673.
[14] Harrington, J. E., 2005. Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority. International
Economic Review 46 (1), 145–169.
36
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
[15] Harrington, J. E., 2017. The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy. MIT Press.
[16] Harrington, J. E., Chang, M.-H., 2009. Modeling the birth and death of cartels with an application to
evaluating competition policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (6), 1400–1435.
[17] Harrington, J. E., Wei, Y., 2017. What can the duration of discovered cartels tell us about the duration
of all cartels? The Economic Journal 127 (604), 1977–2005.
[18] Hay, G. A., Kelley, D., 1974. An empirical survey of price fixing conspiracies. The Journal of Law and
Economics 17 (1), 13–38.
[19] Houba, H., Motchenkova, E., Wen, Q., 2010. Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and
detection probabilities. Economics Bulletin 30 (3), 2017–2027.
[20] Hyytinen, A., Steen, F., Toivanen, O., 2018. Cartels uncovered. American Economic Journal forthcom-
ing.
[21] Iacus, S. M., King, G., Porro, G., 2012. Causal inference without balance checking: Coarsened exact
matching. Political analysis 20 (1), 1–24.
[22] Katsoulacos, Y., Motchenkova, E., Ulph, D., 2015. Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on
price overcharge. International Journal of Industrial Organization 42, 70–80.
[23] Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, D., 2013. Antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel
overcharges. The Economic Journal 123 (572), 558–581.
[24] Koenker, R., Bassett, G., 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46 (1), 33–50.
[25] Miller, N. H., 2009. Strategic leniency and cartel enforcement. American Economic Review 99 (3),
750–768.
[26] Office of Fair Trading, 2010. A guide to oft’s impact estimation methods. OFT1250.
[27] Ormosi, P. L., 2014. A tip of the iceberg? the probability of catching cartels. Journal of Applied
Econometrics 29 (4), 549–566.
[28] OXERA, 2009. Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts.
[29] Rosenbaum, P. R., Rubin, D. B., 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational studies
for causal effects. Biometrika 70 (1), 41–55.
37
